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Abstract 
 
We respond to Ron Weber’s commentaries regarding the necessity of a theoretical core 
in achieving academic legitimacy for the IS field.  We examine the practical problems in 
identifying a theoretical core, clarify the ontological connection between identity and 
legitimacy, acknowledge mistakes in our earlier formulation criticizing the necessity of 
theory in legitimation, and attempt a synthesis between our views and those of Weber.  
The paper concludes with suggestions for improving the workability of efforts to improve 
the legitimacy of the IS field. 
  
 
Introduction 
 
This is a response to Professor Weber’s commentaries in the ongoing discussion of 
what has become known as the “logic of the core” debate.  The discussion, for those not 
familiar with it, is summarized in our book (King and Lyytinen, 2006) Information 
Systems: The State of the Field, particularly chapters 10, 11, 13, and 19. Specifically, we 
respond to Professor Weber’s commentary in Chapter 13 of the book (Weber, 2006a), 
and in this issue of JAIS (Weber, 2006b).  The broad discussion deals with efforts to 
establish identity and legitimacy for the IS field, while this response focuses on the role 
of theory – particularly the establishment of a theoretical core – in achieving legitimacy.  
We assume the reader has been following this discussion, and do not recapitulate it 
here.  Citations, including page numbers, are to original publications, though most of 
them can be found in the book. 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Ron Weber for his persistence and precision in helping us to clarify our 
position.  We are also indebted to logician J. Michael Dunn for his assistance. 
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We will address Professor Weber’s commentaries in four sections: the meaning of the 
theoretical core, reiteration of our views of identity and legitimacy, an attempt at 
synthesis, and some thoughts about the workability of the whole program of legitimacy 
seeking. 
 
The Meaning of the Theoretical Core 
 
We observed in our previous writings that the ongoing discussion of the theoretical core 
has been short on clear explanations of exactly what is meant by a theoretical core 
(Lyytinen and King, 2004 pp. 223).  This starts with the difficulty of describing exactly 
what “theory” means in this context.  As of August 1, 2006, Wikipedia states that the 
word “theory” “…has a number of distinct meanings in different fields of knowledge, 
depending on the context and their methodologies.”  The IS field seeks academic 
legitimacy, so perhaps the Wikipedia characterization of theory for scientific use will 
help: “…a proposed description, explanation, or model of the manner of interaction of a 
set of natural phenomena, capable of predicting future occurrences or observations of 
the same kind, and capable of being tested through experiment or otherwise falsified 
through empirical observation.” Yet, the IS field deals with more than “natural 
phenomena.” Is some or all of IS research excluded from scientific theory?  Problems of 
this sort are common in discussions of the role of theory in science and scholarship. 
 
Professor Weber suggests that any theory serving a legitimating role must be generic, 
powerful, novel to the field seeking legitimation, and recognized as such by other fields 
(Weber, 2006a, p. 297).  There is very little overlap between these characteristics and 
those provided by the Wikipedia description. Again, it is common for different 
descriptions of the attributes of theory to differ considerably from one another.  Is one 
characterization right and the others wrong?  Should we simply make a union of them to 
create a complete description?  Are some characteristics appropriate for some 
conditions, while others are appropriate for other conditions? Researchers in the IS field 
routinely publish papers claiming to be using “structuration theory,” “grounded theory,” 
“garbage-can theory,” and so on.  Do any of these actually count as theory for the 
purposes of legitimation?  If so, how?  Perhaps, as with Justice Stewart’s definition of 
pornography, theory is difficult to define, but people know it when they see it.  This is 
useful for describing something after it appears, but it is less useful when attempting to 
understand, a priori, how to make that thing.   
 
Similar difficulties arise in determining whether a theory is truly novel to a field.  IS 
researchers have used theories related to adaptive structuration in the evolution of 
particular systems, or the competitive advantage gained through use of IT for particular 
purposes.  These add intellectual value, and they seem unique to the IS field.  Should 
they count as part of the theoretical core of the IS field?  If so, then we seem to have at 
least some legitimating theory; if not, why do these theories not count for this purpose?  
We trust the answer is not merely a retreat to the circular observation that the field lacks 
legitimacy, and therefore whatever theory it has must be inadequate. 
 
Moving on to the idea of a theoretical core, how do we handle fields that embrace many 
theories that are in fundamental conflict with one another? Sociology is an identifiable 
and legitimate academic field with a substantial body of theory demonstrating different 
characteristics (e.g., simplicity, elegance, generalizability, accuracy) across multiple 
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levels of analysis (e.g., macro, meso, micro). Different subfields of sociology fiercely 
defend or strenuously reject many of these theories.  The harshest attack on a theory is 
the accusation that it does not qualify as a theory at all.  Sociological training is largely a 
matter of learning how to navigate this complex theoretical maze.  Are all of these 
controversial theories, including those that opponents claim to lack the required 
characteristics of theory itself, part of Sociology’s theoretical core?  How does one 
decide?  In many fields, it is not the theories themselves, but the conflicts over the 
theories that most clearly represent the field.  These conflicts might be evidence of 
revolutions between paradigms (Kuhn, 1996), or wars between incompatible research 
programs (Lakatos, 1974).  Even when we know what a theory might be, how can we tell 
whether a given theory is or should be part of the theoretical core of the IS field? 
 
We also wonder what is meant by a field’s ownership of a theory?  Many theories, 
especially in the social sciences, are claimed by a number of fields.  For example, 
Simon’s theory of bounded rationality has been adopted by economics, psychology, 
organizational behavior, and other fields.  Do they all get to own this theory as part of 
their core, or is only one field permitted to do so?  If only one, how is ownership 
allocated? Simon received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel for his work on rationality, though he was never trained in economics, 
and many economists resent the fact that a “non-economist” was given “their” prize.  
Theories become contested when they become interesting, and ownership becomes 
cloudy (Murray, 1971).  Many academic fields borrow heavily from other fields: 
operations research from mathematics; organizational behavior from economics, 
sociology and psychology; civil engineering from physics.  For some fields, it is hard to 
identify any theories owned by the field.  Yet those fields are identifiable, and the people 
in them seem to feel the fields are legitimate.   
 
We remain unclear on what, exactly, constitutes the theoretical core.  This does not 
mean we deny the reality or importance of theory, or the role it can play in legitimating 
an academic field.  It might be possible as time goes on to develop a more precise 
construct of the theoretical core for the IS field that takes care of these concerns.  In the 
mean time, the uncertainty that surrounds the nature and characteristics of the 
theoretical core of the IS field suggests that legitimacy for the field arising from a 
theoretical core is more likely to happen by accident than to be done on purpose. 
 
Identity and Legitimacy, Redux 
 
Our earlier paper distinguished between academic identity and academic legitimacy 
(King and Lyytinen, 2004).  Identity is ontologically necessary for legitimacy: only 
identifiable things can be legitimate or not legitimate. Once a field is identifiable, it might 
be judged legitimate by being salient to the society at large that patronizes academic 
work, by producing strong results that stand the test of time and prove useful to society, 
and by maintaining sufficient plasticity to sustain salience throughout the time-
consuming process of developing strong results.  We shall turn to the role of identity in 
securing legitimacy below.  Our focus in this section is to untangle the process whereby 
identity is established. 
 
We have argued that academic identity is established primarily by sustained focus on a 
particular subject (King and Lyytinen, 2004).  Identity might also be influenced by the 
kinds of methods used and by the nature of theories arising from the work, but we do not 
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believe these necessary to the establishment of identity because many identifiable 
academic fields lack a theoretical core.  Professor Weber responds that “…some might 
contest the claim made by Lyytinen and King that disciplines like classics, German 
literature, accounting, and history are ‘legitimate’ academic disciplines” (Weber, 2006a: 
297). Whatever Professor Weber thinks about the legitimacy of these fields, he 
acknowledges that they are identifiable simply by mentioning them in this manner.  He is 
not alone.  To prove the point, we turn to the arbiter of the age, Google.   
 
The table below shows the hits from Google searches in which the search string (using 
quotes) was “field of X” and “discipline of X,” where X was one of four nouns: classics, 
literature, accounting, and history.2 These phrases are in routine use among academic 
institutions. We assume that the people who use these phrases do so in the belief that 
these exist as identifiable fields or disciplines, and that they are identifiable enough to be 
referenced in such fashion. (For those interested, a search on the field/discipline of 
information systems also fares pretty well, yielding 63,000 hits.)  
 
Table 1. 
Search String Hits 
Field/discipline of classics >130,000 
Field/discipline of literature >110,000 
Field/discipline of accounting >145,000 
Field/discipline of history >245,000 
 
This analysis proves nothing beyond the fact that people routinely use phrases such as 
“the field of history,” and they seem to think they know what they are talking about.  One 
could construct a definition of what it means to be an identifiable academic field that 
would render such colloquial uses wrong, but that would not change the fact that people 
use these terms meaningfully.   
 
Our disagreement with Professor Weber on identity hinges on whether a field can gain 
identity even if it lacks a theoretical core.  We argue that it can, and that there is 
evidence to support our claim. We are willing to meet Professor Weber at least part-way 
in two respects: we are not claiming that a sustained focus on a particular subject is 
necessary for establishing academic identity, although we cannot think of an identifiable 
field without such a focus; and we are not arguing against a role for a theoretical core in 
the establishment of academic identity.  Our disagreement is whether possession of a 
theoretical core is necessary for academic identity. We think it is not. 
 
Seeking Synthesis 
 
                                                 
2 That is, the hits in the row labeled Field/discipline of classics is the sum of hits for two searches, 
“discipline of classics” and “field of classics.”  We shortened “German literature” to just 
literature, but combined hits for “discipline of German literature” and “field of German literature” 
were less than 1,000.  We wanted to know whether these hits were related to academic use of 
such search strings, so we scanned the first 100 hits in each search and found that nearly all of the 
hits were to web sites hosted at academic institutions.  We also ran each search again with the 
string “.edu” included, finding that searches with and without .edu yielded almost identical 
numbers of hits. 
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Our primary dispute in this ongoing discussion is with those who argue that a theoretic 
core is necessary to establish academic legitimacy. The intent of this section is to find a 
way to reconcile these views, or at least specify the conditions under which they cannot 
be reconciled. However, before we begin we must first clear up some confusion we 
introduced in our earlier work, and that Professor Weber rightly notes. 
 
In Lyytinen and King (2004) we developed a formal argument to clarify what we saw as 
the key logical positions of those who claim that a theoretical core is necessary for 
academic legitimacy.  We read the articles that had been published on this subject, and 
tried to tease out what each position would mean for formulating strategy that the IS field 
might follow.  It was our view that many of these logical arguments were not articulated 
well, and in some situations the arguments appeared to commit a fallacy of reasoning.  
Professor Weber (2006b) takes us to task for weakness in details of the formal argument 
we developed, and points out a number of errors in our formulation.  We stand corrected 
on his technical points.  We retract that formulation, and we apologize to our readers 
(and particularly Professor Weber) for preoccupying them with what we confess is a 
sloppy piece of work.3
 
That said, we reiterate the point that most concerned us: that “A implies B” does not 
entail “not-A implies not-B.”  Even if it is true that having a theoretical core implies 
legitimacy (a point we do not concede), it is not thereby true that failure to have a 
theoretical core implies non-legitimacy.  From our reading of Professor Weber’s critique, 
we believe that he would agree with us on this point, at least on straight logical grounds.   
 
The disagreement between Professor Weber’s position and our own appears to come 
down to the necessity and sufficiency of a theoretic core in pursuit of academic 
legitimacy.  We identify two positions of necessity and sufficiency we cannot accept:4
 
• A theoretical core is necessary and sufficient for academic legitimacy.  We do not 
believe Professor Weber takes this position, and we have not seen this position 
taken by anyone else in the discussion, although Professor Weber says that 
some have (Weber, 2006b).   
 
• A theoretical core is necessary but not sufficient for academic legitimacy. This 
appears to be Professor Weber’s position (2006b). 
 
One might protest that Professor Weber does not hold to the second position.  He says, 
“Some (including myself) contend that having a theoretical core is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for academic legitimacy.  Rather, it is a necessary condition for 
having a clear disciplinary identity” (Weber, 2006b)  (Italics in original).  As discussed 
above, identity is ontologically necessary for legitimacy, and must precede it.  By 
transitivity, anything necessary for identity is necessary for legitimacy, so a theoretical 
core is necessary for legitimacy.  
                                                 
3  We often tell our doctoral students, poor writing is most often the result of poor thinking.  We 
feel obligated to offer this as an instructive illustration of that point. 
4  There is a third: That a theoretical core and academic legitimacy are mutually exclusive 
(negative sufficiency). We do not believe anyone involved in the discussion to date has taken such 
a position.  We include it simply for completeness. 
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We disagree with any position contending that a theoretical core is a necessary 
condition for achieving academic legitimacy.  If formulated via transitivity (i.e., that a 
theoretical core is necessary for identity, and therefore for legitimacy) we reply that there 
are identifiable academic fields that do not have a theoretical core.  If formulated directly 
(i.e., a theoretical core is a necessary condition of legitimacy, irrespective of identity), we 
see no logical grounds for the claim, and little empirical evidence to back it up.   
 
There is a possibility for reconciliation and synthesis between Professor Weber’s 
position and ours.  We concede that a strong theoretical core and academic legitimacy 
are correlated.  We further concede that there is probably a causal relationship in which 
the creation of such a theoretical core increases legitimacy (this is subsumed under our 
strong results condition).  We can imagine circumstances in which strong results – 
perhaps singling out strong theoretical results – might be overwhelmingly dominant in 
the production of academic legitimacy.  Our position is not that far from that of Professor 
Weber. Were he to concede that a theoretical core is not necessary for academic 
identity, our positions would shift from a difference in kind, to a difference in degree.  Our 
debate would turn on the question: To what extent does having a theoretical core 
influence the academic legitimacy of a field?  The possession of a theoretical core might 
be of overwhelming or even exclusive importance in achieving legitimacy in some cases, 
and this need not be necessary for it to be true. 
 
Workability 
 
Assuming the positions can be reconciled as noted above, it is worthwhile to consider 
the conditions under which achieving academic legitimacy is most important.  This might 
include additions to or reframing of the conditions under discussion thus far (e.g., a 
strong theoretical core, salience, strong results, plasticity).  Our shared objective with 
Professor Weber is to strengthen the academic legitimacy of the IS field.  There might be 
multiple paths to this objective, but as long as the paths are equifinal, our arguments 
about which path is best should be limited to workability. 
 
Any path taken must be evaluated in terms of reachability and cost-effectiveness.  Some 
paths to an objective are good in principle, but under particular circumstances cannot be 
traversed successfully.  Among reachable pathways, we favor the low-energy-cost path 
if one can be found.  We have never suggested that academic legitimacy for the IS field 
cannot be reached via the theory path: we just believe it is less cost-effective than 
leveraging the IS field’s inherent salience, coupled with sufficient plasticity to maintain 
that salience.  Improving the strength of the field’s results, including through new theory, 
can solidify the legitimacy that comes from those efforts, but we favor efforts to produce 
strong empirical results over pursuit of theory.  Breakthroughs in theory can have 
enormous consequences for legitimacy, but the history of science suggests that big 
theoretical wins do not come from nascent calls to build theory.  Most arise in sustained, 
often intensive, pursuit of common concerns facing the research community (e.g. Richter 
and Ting’s experiments that made sense out a Gell-Mann idea that led to a coherent 
theory of quarks), and many others occur through discoveries by individuals working in 
intellectual niches that most people do not recognize as particularly important (e.g., 
McClintock and transposable genetic elements).  The pursuit of strong theory is a high-
risk, high-return strategy in the short term, and it is a subtle art to achieve the right 
balance. 
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Conclusions 
 
Our discussion revolves around a shared concern for improving the legitimacy of the IS 
field.  Some think there is only one path to this goal.  We think there are many pathways 
to the goal, including theirs.  Professor Weber’s commentary in this issue of JAIS 
suggests that strong theory is worth reaching for, invoking our use of the reach/grasp 
metaphor from Robert Browning’s poem.  It is an apt use of the metaphor: scholars 
typically do have to reach beyond what they can grasp in the creation of important new 
theory.  Our use of the metaphor was not focused on this, however.  We challenged the 
field to refute dysfunctional ethnocentrism and look beyond to the opportunities that are 
within reach, even if that reach is risky.  We think the field should be bolder and more 
confident in its pursuits, whether they be theoretical or otherwise.  It is possible that we 
have introduced new error or confusion to the discussion with this response, although 
we have tried to avoid that.  In any case, we do not believe the highest and best use of 
the field’s time lies in haggling endlessly over issues of theoretical necessity when a 
large fraction of the community will either disregard the arguments or do whatever they 
please anyway.   
 
Besides, there may be happier reasons to refocus the field’s attention on opportunities.  
As we suggest earlier (King and Lyytinen, 2004), a great deal of the current anxiety 
about the IS field is rooted in declining enrollments for IS programs in management 
schools.  It should come as welcome news that a recent study involving interviews with 
45 management school deans showed rebounding recognition of the centrality of 
information technology in management education, and new ideas about how to 
incorporate IT in MBA curricula (Dhar and Sundararajan, 2006).  This is the venue where 
we prefer to invest our efforts going forward. 
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